Privatization Versus Competition: Changing Enterprise Behavior in Russia by Earle, J.S. & Estrin, S.
Privatization Versus Competition: 
Changing Enterprise Behavior in 
Russia
Earle, J.S. and Estrin, S.
IIASA Working Paper
 
May 1996
Earle, J.S. and Estrin, S. (1996) Privatization Versus Competition: Changing Enterprise Behavior in Russia. IIASA Working 
Paper. Copyright © 1996 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/4977/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
Working Paper
Privatization Versus Competition:
Changing Enterprise Behavior in
Russia
John S. Earle
and
Saul Estrin
WP-96-049
May 1996
IIASA
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg Austria
Telephone: 43 2236 807 Fax: 43 2236 71313 E-Mail: info@iiasa.ac.at
Privatization Versus Competition:
Changing Enterprise Behavior in
Russia
John S. Earle
and
Saul Estrin
WP-96-049
May 1996
Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed
herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member
Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work.
IIASA
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg Austria
Telephone: 43 2236 807 Fax: 43 2236 71313 E-Mail: info@iiasa.ac.at
Foreword
The Economic Transition and Integration (ETI) Project at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) started a research activity on the behavior of Rus-
sian enterprises under liberalization, privatization and restructuring in 1995{1996. This
activity originated upon the initiative of the Ministry of Economy of the Russian Fed-
eration. The major reason for focusing on this subject was the fact that the current
state and further transformation of Russian medium and large sized enterprises became
a challenge for the continuation and success of transition related reforms. Despite cer-
tain positive tendencies, numerous enterprises still adjust themselves to ongoing changes
without considerable market adaptation and modernization. The emerging ownership
structure and nancial markets demonstrate limited positive inuence on stockholders'
incentives, decision-making process and strategies of restructuring.
In the course of these enterprise studies, a workshop on \Russian Enterprises on the
Path of Market Adaptation and Restructuring" was organized at IIASA on 1{3 February
1996. Russian and Western experts, extensively working in the area of enterprise perfor-
mance under transition, focused the discussions on recent empirical ndings and analyses
concerning the following issues: typical models of enterprise behavior; development of the
nancial situation at the enterprises and its determinants; impact of emerging markets
and competition on enterprises; the consequences of privatization and patterns of restruc-
turing; and enterprise social assets divestiture and conversion. The workshop arrived at
both analytical conclusions and recommendations for policy measures stimulating \con-
structive" enterprise behavior. Possibilities for a joint research project on the motivations
and behavior of enterprises in transition economies were also discussed.
The circulation of selected workshop papers as IIASA Working Papers is undertaken
in order to provoke broad discussions of presented analytical results. Professors John S.
Earle and Saul Estrin dedicate this paper to the thorough analysis of the comparative
impact of privatization and competition on enterprise incentives and performance by the
relation of behavioral indicators to the variables, measuring ownership and competition.
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Changing Enterprise Behavior in
Russia

John S. Earle

and
Saul Estrin

\There is no point in liberalizing prices before the monopolies have been dis-
mantled." G. Yavlinsky (January 1994).
\Privatization is useless with a monopolistic market structure."
V. Klaus (1990).
\More important in many cases than changing the `ownership' is changing the
market structure | subjecting these enterprises to competition."
J. Stiglitz (1994, p. 136).
1 Introduction
The dramatic program of privatization and liberalization in Russia oers an exceptional
opportunity to test the relative ecacy of corporate governance and product market
competition as mechanisms for disciplining the behavior of rms. Previous research con-
cerning the eects on rm behavior of ownership change and exposure to competitive
markets has been somewhat inconclusive, for a number of reasons. To begin with, most
studies have analyzed rms or industries in developed capitalist economies and under-
taken static, cross-section comparisons of \performance" (usually dened as protability)
across observations with xed ownership structures and market environments (e.g., Vining
and Boardman (1992)). Given the diculties of adequately controlling for heterogene-
ity and the possible endogeneity of ownership and market structure, however, it would
perhaps be more persuasive to examine the eects of changes in these conditions on a

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given set of rms. Yet, in the stable economies of the West, there have been few opportu-
nities to analyze rms which have undergone signicant changes in their ownership and
environment.
Furthermore, if one accepts the basic premise of most prior studies that the units
of observation are in some kind of long-run equilibrium (or at least that disequilibrium
can be adequately controlled for), then it is likely that the possible behavioral changes
or potential eciency gains which could be observed by the researcher are rather small.
This is particularly so in light of the fact that most of the economies where such studies
are undertaken are dominated by private ownership and \workably competitive" markets,
so that the general environment may still exert a disciplining force even if the particular
conditions facing the rm do not. State-owned monopolies in the West, after all, usually
operate in competitive markets for managers, labor, and most other factors; they can
avail themselves of the latest technologies, organizational innovations, and managerial
techniques; their performance can be compared, according to a common set of standards,
with neighboring privately owned, competitive rms; and instances of gross malfeasance
can be publicly evaluated and remedied through a democratic process: all of these factors
(at least in principle) would seem to go quite some distance towards mitigating inecien-
cies associated with state ownership and monopoly power.
The situation in Russia (and other transition economies) stands in stark contrast.
Concerning ownership change, the privatization program has transferred shares in more
than 12,000 companies from state to private hands, resulting in a wide variety of new
ownership structures, including the participation of insiders, outsiders, and in many cases
still the state. Simultaneously, policies have been enacted to liberalize prices, foreign
trade, and the entry of new businesses; yet many highly concentrated sectors remain. In
a few short years, a large number of rms have been privatized and experienced a rise in
competition, but the outcomes are quite heterogeneous.
Moreover, regardless of their current ownership or of the conditions in the product mar-
kets which they presently face, all Russian enterprises which are more than a few years
old have assets | including plant and equipment, labor forces, managerial skills, organi-
zational capital and modes of operating | which were built up for the most part during
a period when there was nothing approaching a competitive market environment and
essentially no private ownership. The consequence is the manifest need of Russian enter-
prises for large-scale restructuring along many dimensions and for a drastic re-orientation
towards the market and away from the state. For the researcher, the situation holds out
the possibility for observing substantial dierences in behavior.
This paper employs evidence from a recent, in-depth survey of 394 Russian manufac-
turing rms to examine the association between ownership, market structure and rm
behavior. We exploit the rich variation across rms in the extent of privatization, in the
identity of the dominant new owners (managers, workers, or outsiders) and in the degree
to which product markets have become competitive, as measured by several indicators
including concentration ratios, import penetration ratios, location, the geographic scope
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of markets, and the subjective reporting of the enterprise managers themselves. We use
information on behavior of the rms \pre-reform" and more recently to measure several
dimensions of restructuring and performance, including changes in product lines, lay-
os and labor productivity. We then relate these behavioral indicators to the variables
measuring ownership and competition.
The enterprise data set on which we focus is particularly appropriate for this purpose.
Organized by the World Bank, the survey was conducted by VTsIOM (the All-Russian
Center for Public Opinion Analysis) on a sample drawn from a complete list of all Russian
industrial rms in 1991 with employment greater than 15. The population was rst
stratied by size and region, and then an initial sample was randomly drawn. Sample
replacement (of rms on the initial list which declined to participate) was implemented on
the basis of industrial branch in addition to size and region.
1
Severe problems of missing
data run throughout the survey data, and our usable set for the purpose of assessing
ownership is reduced to 321 observations. Fan and Lee (1995) and the appendix to
Commander, Fan, and Schaer (forthcoming) contain detailed descriptions of the survey.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief summary of
ownership change in Russia, dening the variables which we use in our empirical analysis.
Section 3 pulls together information about market structure in Russia, drawing on ocial
statistical data and other researchers' estimations, in addition to our calculations from the
enterprise survey. We pay particular attention to variation across rms in the geographic
scope of markets. Section 4 describes our approach to measuring restructuring and per-
formance, we describe the several indicators we use in this paper. Section 5 contains the
estimation results for equations relating the restructuring and performance variables to
ownership, market structure and other covariates. Section 6 concludes.
2 Ownership Change in Russia
The pace and magnitude of ownership change in Russia in the early 1990s dwarf any
contemporary or historical comparisons. From an initial condition of nearly 100 percent
state ownership in the manufacturing sector in 1990, most enterprises had been mostly
privatized by mid-1994. Excluding de novo rms, Table 1 shows the percentage of shares
held by the state and by the private sector, as well as the percentage of rms more than 50
percent privatized as of July 1994, for broad industry groups and roughly 2-digit branches
of industry for the sample of rms in the World Bank survey data.
2
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The survey also included 45 rms in the new private sector, drawn from separate regional lists. We
have excluded these new start-ups from the current analysis, because we cannot observe them \before"
and \after" the reform (since by denition, they did not exist prior to the reform, at least not legally).
Moreover, they are fundamentally dierent from the \old" rms in that they do not face the same set of
restructuring problems.
2
These patterns and the privatization program which gave rise to them are analyzed in greater detail
in our 1995b paper, together with the legal setup and functioning of corporate governance institutions at
the level of enterprises.
3
Overall, 62 percent of formerly state-owned shares were privately owned, and 67 per-
cent of former state enterprises were subject to the potential control of private owners
(dened as greater than 50 percent ownership). The pattern diers quite signicantly by
branch, however: rates of privatization are highest in consumer goods sectors and lowest
in energy and fuel.
As we have discussed elsewhere (1995a), the potential for new private owners to gain
control, undertake restructuring and improve performance of privatized companies is likely
to depend on the type of new owner who dominates. To summarize briey, it may make a
dierence if the dominant owner-group consists of outsiders or of insiders (rm employees),
but we have also argued that dierent types of insiders |managers versus non-managerial
employees | may be likely to exhibit dierent objectives and face dierent constraints
as dominant owners; and the same may be true for the various types of outsiders |
banks, foreign companies, domestic partner companies, or citizens (for instance, as the
result of a voucher program). To summarize briey, insider-owners are less likely to be
successful at restructuring and improving performance, compared with some types of
outsiders.
3
Insiders, particularly workers, may have greater diculties in raising capital
(due to lenders' fears of expropriation, aggravated by a poorly functioning bankruptcy
regime) and in making decisions which may have distributional implications, that is which
create losers as well as winners among them.
Indeed, the Russian privatization program resulted in insider domination in the vast
majority of cases, as shown in Table 2. Of the average 62.4 percent of private shareholdings
for all the companies in the sample, more than three-quarters, or 48.2 percentage points
are owned by insiders, of which more than two-thirds belong to workers. Once again, the
patterns dier signicantly by sector. For instance, although insiders dominate overall,
there are nonetheless signicant pockets of outside ownership in the Russian economy.
Outsiders are especially prevalent in heavy industry. We exploit the large variations in
ownership patterns in our estimation of the determinants of restructuring and performance
below.
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3 Competition Measures and Policy
This section describes alternative measures of concentration and competitiveness in Rus-
sian markets, drawing on information from the survey of Russian rms and from secondary
3
That is, under the counterfactual that the program had been designed to facilitate greater outside
ownership, particularly controlling stakes by large foreign or institutional investors. It is dicult to dis-
pute Chubais' contention that Russian policymakers in 1992 faced a severely constrained set of politically
feasible programs.
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Here we have reported information only on the overall pattern of shareholding, while in our earlier
(1995b) paper we presented estimates of the incidence of nonvoting shares. Because most nonvoting shares
are held by insiders and the state, counting only voting shares raises quite signicantly the relative state
of outsiders. The results reporting below concerning the relationship between behavior and ownership,
however, are robust to this change of specication.
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sources. Our purpose is not to evaluate the aggregate or average degree of concentration
in the Russian economy, but merely to establish the fact of signicant variation across
product markets within Russia, variation which we hypothesize could account for some
of the dierences among rms in the extent of restructuring.
5
Means for the variables by
industry groups are shown in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
Our rst set of indicators draws upon two studies of concentration in Russia: Brown,
Ickes, and Ryterman (1994, henceforth BIR) and Joskow, Schmalensee, and Tsukanova
(1994, henceforth JST). BIR present 4-rm sales concentration ratios calculated by Plan-
Econ for 2-digit branches in 1989; we have labeled this variable CR4B. JST present 4-rm
sales concentration ratios at a more disaggregated level (approximately 4-digit industries)
in 1991, but for a limited number of sectors: only 101 rms. Given the substantial
arbitrariness in dening levels of disaggregation across heterogeneous classes of products,
and assuming there was little change in market shares from 1989 to 1991 (since the major
reforms started in 1992), we have also combined the two variables, using CR4J when it
is available, and otherwise using CR4B; the new variable is called CR4BJ. The variables
show quite a high variance in concentration: CR4BJ has a mean of .27 and a range from
.03 to 1.
The second set of indicators uses the information in the survey to estimate Herndahl-
Hirschman indices for 2-digit sectors. To minimize the number of missing values, we use
employment as the base variable. To calculate appropriate weights, we use data from
1993, when aggregate employment gures by sector are available. HIRAW is simply the
sample index for each sector:
HIRAW =
m
X
j=1
S
2
j
;
where S
j
= share of rm j in sectoral employment in the sample of m rms in the sector.
Our sample was stratied by size (as well as region), and if we maintain the assumption
that the size distribution is also representative for each sector, then it is possible to
estimate the index for the population quite simply as follows:
HIADJ = (m/n)*HIRAW,
where m/n is the ratio of the number of rms in the sample to the number in the popula-
tion for each sector.
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HIRAW also displays quite signicant variation with a range from
.09 to .87, but HIADJ achieves a maximum of only .05.
5
Ickes,Ryterman, and Tenev (1995) argue that \very intense" competition may have a negative eect
on enterprise adjustment (because of short-run adjustment costs), and examine qualitative indicators of
adjustment.
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To demonstrate this, dene HI = population Herndahl-Hirschman index
=
n
X
i=1
P
2
i
5
Although the potential for foreign competition to exert some disciplinary eect in Rus-
sia is frequently discounted (for instance, in JST, p. 303), we have gathered data on im-
ports and computed import penetration ratios to allow an explicit test of the hypothesis.
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IP0 (derived from Roskomstat data) is import penetration from the \far abroad", which
excludes the former Soviet Union; while IP1 (from the World Bank) includes all imports.
Both variables take output+imports{exports for each sector as the denominator, and the
two variables are highly correlated. Both vary signicantly across sectors.
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The next group of indicators in Table 3.1 adjusts the concentration ratios above for
import penetration. We multiply each concentration ratio by (1-IP1) which represents
the share of domestic sales accounted for by domestic producers; where import penetra-
tion is greater, the sales concentration ratio is correspondingly reduced.
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In fact, this
adjustment has a signicant impact on measured concentration, reducing both its mean
and its variance. But there is still signicant variation across sectors, for instance from
.03 to .77 in CR4BJIP1.
The nal indicator in Table 3.1 comes from the survey: PRICONT is a dummy equal
1 if the rm reports that the prices for its major products are subject to state control.
The 1991 Law \On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Goods Mar-
kets" dened dominant market position as 35 percent or more (to be set annually by the
State Committee on Anti-Monopoly Policy), and the 35 percent denition was used in
the \anti-monopoly lists" which the government ordered local anti-monopoly committees
to compile in early 1992. According to JST (p. 339), \[I]n August 1992, the Gaidar
government ordered federal and regional price committees to regulate the prices of most
where P
i
= proportion of employment of rm i in the population of the given sector. Say the sample
contains m rms (as above) drawn from the n rms in the population in a size-wise representative fashion,
in which case S
i
= (n/m)P
i
for any rm i in the sample. Further suppose that the population can be
decomposed into K groups of equally size rms, where groups are indexed by k, the kth group containing
1
k
rms. Then HI can be written
K
X
k=1
1
k
P
k
;
since each element of group k has an equal share P
k
. The sample can be similarly decomposed into K
groups, each of size (mn/n)1
k
, and the sample
HIRAW =
K
X
k=1
(
m
n
l
k
)(
n
m
P
k
)
2
substituting S
i
= (n/m)P
i
from above. Simplifying the equation yields the formula for HIADJ (the
approximation to HI).
7
The \import discipline hypothesis" originated in Esposito and Esposito (1971), was continued with
Geroski and Jaquemin (1981), and has been tested on a data set of Czech industries by Earle and
Worgotter (1994).
8
It might be useful to try to construct variables measuring the extent of eective protection, which
were found to have high explanatory power in Carlsson (1972) and Saunders (1980), although it should
be noted that those studies were conducted at the industry rather than the rm level.
9
This adjustment is suggested in Scherer and Ross (1990), p. 79.
6
goods produced by rms on the monopoly registers". Although this authority was sup-
posed to expire at the end of 1993, it seems that much of the regulation continued. Thus,
the existence of price controls may reect market power, at least as perceived by local
anti-monopoly committees (although one cannot preclude a variety of other motivations).
Table 3.2 contains a group of subjective indicators of the extent of market power
based on responses to questions on the survey of rms. Managers were asked to report
whether they had \major competitors for [their] major products" and, if so, how many.
\Major competitors" is not precisely dened in the survey question, and no doubt it would
have been dicult to do so in economically meaningful terms. On the other hand, given
the diculties in choosing the appropriate size of the market for any given rm and of
measuring the strength of actual and potential competitors in it, the managers' subjective
evaluation may be an indicator worth investigating. We dene MAJCOMPD as a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the manager reports that the rm faces a major competitor, and 75
percent (the mean of MAJCOMPD) of rm managers report that they do. Taken literally,
this would imply that one quarter of the sample rms are monopolists or dominant rms
in their industry. MAJCOMP# is the number of major competitors, equal to zero if
MAJCOMPD is, and the average is 21 with a range from 0 to 1100.
The managers were also asked to report the geographic breakdown of the competition
they face; under the presumption that foreign competition may be a particularly pow-
erful disciplinary device, we have computed the variables MAJFORD and MAJFOR#,
measuring whether the rm reports any foreign competitor (= 1 if so; = 0 otherwise) and
the number of foreign competitors, respectively. In fact, a surprising number of Russian
rms | 51 observations, or 20 percent of the valid sample | report that they face foreign
competition. The average number of foreign competitors is 9 (including zeroes), with a
maximum of 1000.
Transportation and infrastructural deciencies probably act as a barrier not only to
foreign competition, but to domestic producers located in other regions as well. To pro-
vide some assessment of the geographic dimension in which rms operate, Table 3.3 gives
a summary of the rms' reports on the extent to which revenue is generated locally
(RAYON), regionally (OBLAST), nationally (NATIONAL), and from 3 dierent cate-
gories of countries importing Russian goods (former Soviet Union (FSU), former CMEA
(CMEA), and non-FSU, non-CMEA markets (WEST)). While on average 50 percent of
revenue is derived from markets which the rms describe as national, there is considerable
heterogeneity. The hypothesis for these variables is that the wider the geographic scope
of the market, the more competition faced by the rm; thus, concentration ratios should
be adjusted accordingly.
It is an issue of ongoing (and perhaps ultimately unresolvable) controversy as to which
measure of concentration is most appropriate, or, indeed, whether the choice makes any
7
dierence.
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The appropriate specication of foreign competition and, more generally, of
geographic scope is also unresolved. The basic problem is that the relevant concept |
how near the market approaches perfect competition | is simply not measurable (short
of a Lerner index). For instance, in principle it is possible for a market with one seller
to be perfectly competitive nonetheless, if it is also perfectly contestable; all observable
indicators would imply a monopoly situation, but behavior would be otherwise. It is not
our purpose to try to resolve these controversies here, but merely to put forward a set
of variables which may be proxies for potential determinants of enterprise behavior. We
allow the variables to enter and interact in a variety of alternative specications in our
estimations below.
4 Indicators of Restructuring and Performance
The transition underway in Russia and other East European countries provides a particu-
larly interesting quasi-experimental setting within which to investigate (among a number
of topics) the eects of changes in corporate governance and in the economic environment
upon the behavior of rms. As is well-recognized in both earlier work on soviet-type
economies and in the new literature in transition economics, the behavior and organi-
zation of state-owned enterprises within socialist economic systems are fundamentally
dierent compared to conventional rms in market economies. The speed and magnitude
of change in the objectives and constraints of rms in the transition would thus imply
that one may observe large changes in their behavior as they adjust from one system to
another.
11
The dierent context has implications not only for the magnitude of change which may
be observed, but also for the types of behavior which are interesting to measure. Anal-
yses of the eects of privatization or of concentration in developed capitalist economies
are frequently conducted under the implicit assumption that the rms are observed in a
steady-state equilibrium, so that it is appropriate to focus directly on measures of perfor-
mance, particularly protability. In the transition situation, by contrast, what is perhaps
more interesting is the ability of rms (under the inuence of new owners and a new eco-
nomic environment) to change their behavior in desirable directions. Protability may be
a particularly poor measure of behavioral change, certainly so in the short run, because
many types of restructuring may impose higher short-run costs and only increase prots
in the longer run (even leaving aside the accounting problems which are multiplied in a
10
See Kwoka (1981) for a summary of the issues and the argument that high correlation among alter-
native measures does not imply that the choice is immaterial. Also see Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter
(1986), who argue in favor of the Herndahl-Hirschman index.
11
Indeed, the changes over 1991 to 1994 are at an order of magnitude seldom if ever seen in most
\normal" situations: for instance, the mean change in real output for the rms in our sample is {
52.2 percent, the mean change in nominal output is 16585.7 percent (the dierence due to the near-
hyperination in Russia over this period), and the mean change in employment is {25.2 percent.
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situation where the accounting system is itself undergoing a transition and few rms are
subject to rigorous outside audit).
For these reasons, we nd it use to examine behavioral variables which may capture
some of the major dimensions of the restructuring process: product market, employment,
compensation, unbundling (changing boundaries), and investment. Elsewhere (1995c), we
have provided some defense of each of these categories as well as put forth the argument
that restructuring is a process of overall change which cannot be captured by any one
variable and instead requires the construction of an aggregate index or set of indices;
these we shall not repeat here. This paper instead describes a few individual indicators
of change in the conduct of rms over the 1990 to 1994 period: product lines, layos and
labor productivity.
Summary statistics for the restructuring indicators are shown in Table 4. CORPROD
is the simple correlation coecient between the structure of a rm's production in 1994
with that in 1990 (each rm provided the percentage of the value of its output obtained
from each of 3 major products in 1994 and from the same 3 in 1990). Some rms changed
the composition of their outputs dramatically, but on average there was only moderate
adjustment: the mean correlation is .56. LAYOFF is the rm's layo rate from the
beginning of 1992 until the time of the survey in July 1994 (dened as the ratio of number
of workers laid o to the mean of employment in 1991 and employment in 1994).
We also investigate labor productivity as an indicator of the performance of dierent
rms. Here we are interested in the eects of privatization and increased competition on
the level rather than the change in the dependent variable. But to control for the fact that
labor productivity may vary systematically for a variety of reasons (for instance, dierent
capital/labor ratios) across rms, we include the lagged (pre-reform) level on the right-
hand side. These equations may also be interpreted as restructuring equations, where the
rm has managed to reduce employment while keeping output up, or to raise output while
keeping employment down. Two versions of labor productivity, dened as nominal sales
per employee (S/EMP), and real output per employee (RX/EMP), are shown in Table 4,
both for 1994 (subscript 4) and the lagged value in 1990 (subscript 0).
5 Estimation Results
Our estimating equations take the following general form:
RI
i
= f(OWN
i
, COMP
i
, X
i
),
where RI = an indicator of restructuring (described above), OWN is a vector of owner-
ship variables which varies across specications, COMP is a vector of variables measuring
the extent of competition in the rm's product market which also varies across specica-
tions, and X is a vector of other covariates, usually including regional dummy variables.
The productivity equations are similarly specied, but X includes the (4-year) lagged
dependent variable.
9
The dierences in our approach from the conventional one in much of the literatures on
ownership and market structure deserves some emphasis. In the previous section, we tried
to justify our use of left-hand side measures which also dier from the conventional focus
on protability: what fascinates in the transition is how rms adjust to the rapid changes
in and around themmore than their short-run performance. In our productivity equations,
we also evaluate performance, but these equations also dier from those in the small
literature on the \x-ineciency" of monopolies and state ownership. In those literatures,
the typical unit of observation is a rm (or industry) with unchanging ownership and
facing unchanging product market conditions; variation exists only in the cross-section and
therefore includes any unmeasurable idiosyncratic components.
12
By contrast, many of
our rms were privatized and most of them faced some change in the degree of competition
which they faced. Using information from before and after the reforms, we hope to be
able to control for the idiosyncratic component of variation.
We have investigated a wide variety of specications of the general model described
above, and we report only representative results here. Here we report results for the four
indicators discussed in the previous section: two version of labor productivity (S/EMP
and RX/EMP), extent of changes in the product mix (CORPROD), and the layo rate
(LAYOFF).
In the estimation results below, we allow for 2 alternative specications of ownership
and 3 alternative specications of competition. OWN1 is simply PSH, the percentage of
shares in the rm which are privately held. OWN2 includes WSH, MSH, and OSH, a
disaggregation of PSH among workers, managers, and outsiders, respectively.
The competition specications are as follows:
13
COMP1: CR4BJ, CR4BJ*IP
COMP2: INVMC# (1/(MAJCOMP+1)), MAJFORD
COMP3: PRICONT
Combined, the 2 OWN specications and 3 COMP specications make 6 total for
each dependent variable. In addition, to control for the hardness of budget constraints,
GOVSUP, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the rm reports receiving any kind of state
support in 1992{94, is included in all specications. The lagged dependent variable is
included in productivity equations, for reasons discussed in the previous section. Among
a number of other specications, we also estimated equations which included regional
dummies and the measures of the geographic scope of the rm's markets (from Table
12
See Vining and Boardman (1992) for a summary of literature and the results of such an analysis using
data on a sample of Canadian rms. Information on rms which have experienced a change in ownership
(state to private) or in product market conditions seems to be largely anecdotal; see, for instance, the
discussion in Scherer and Ross (1990), Chapter 18, and the studies cited therein.
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We tried a number of other specications, including the Herndahl-Hirschman indices calculated
from our sample, and various interactions of a number of competition variables, but they were either
insignicant, or (to say much the same thing), they did not substantially aect the conclusions we
present here.
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3.3), entered separately, as well as interactively with CR4BJ, with CR4BJ*IP, and with
IP. None of these additions materially aected the results from the simpler specications,
shown in Tables 5.1 to 5.4.
The results in Table 5.1 demonstrate a clear positive eect of privatization on produc-
tivity, measured as S/EMP in 1994. The magnitude of the coecient is large, suggesting
between 3 and 5 percent increase in productivity for each additional percentage of shares
which are privately owned. The result holds across all specications which include PSH,
although when ownership is disaggregated among workers (WSH), managers (MSH), and
outsiders (OSH), the results are signicant only for MSH and OSH together with COMP2.
Competition variables show up as signicant only in COMP1, where sales per employee
is increased by concentration (CR4BJ), but the eect is lowered by import penetration
(CR4BJ*IP). Because sales are dened in nominal terms, it is dicult to know if these re-
sults, taken alone, imply that monopoly raises productivity and that import competition
reduces it, or (more likely) that monopoly raises prices and import competition reduces
monopoly power, since revenue can be increased by increasing price as well as quantity.
The specications with other denitions of market power (COMP2 and COMP3) return
no signicant aects of the market environment on rm productivity.
The estimations with real output per employee (RX/EMP), shown in Table 5.2 strong-
ly conrm the positive eect of privatization, and most particularly of managerial share
ownership, on productivity. The complete lack of signicance for any of the competition
variables in these specicants (and all others which we tried, also including our measures
of the geographic scope of markets and regional dummies) suggest market power may
have enabled rms in Russia to raise prices, but increased competition is not associated
with increased eciency.
The results of estimating equations with CORPROD as the dependent variable ap-
pear in Table 5.3. The coecient on PSH is positive, but nowhere precisely estimated.
Because a positive coecient would imply less product market restructuring on the part
of privatized rms, it is especially worth investigating. Elsewhere (1995a), we have hy-
pothesized that rms with predominant worker ownership would be less likely to engage
in much internal re-organization insofar as such restructuring creates losers as well as win-
ners inside the rm. In specications 2 and 6, where OWN2 is used so that the eects of
dierent types of new share-owners can be disentangled, WSH is positive and signicant.
Only MSH is always negative, and only in conjunction with COMP2 (specication 4).
Interestingly, outsiders also seem less eager to engage in this type of restructuring. The
only competition variable to show up signicantly in this equation is the interaction of the
concentration ratio with the import penetration ratio. This result, which also holds when
IP is entered separately, and not only interactively, suggests that imports may stimulate
adjustment.
Determinants of layo behavior are shown in Table 5.4. PSH is positive and signicant
in most specications, and when disaggregated, the ownership eects turn out, for reasons
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similar to those for CORPROD, to come predominantly from managerial ownership. No
competition variables are signicant in these equations.
14
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have made an initial attempt to measure whether the recent change
of regime in Russia has had consequences for enterprise behavior. That some aspects of
behavior have changed substantially is not in doubt, as a glance at our summary statistics
or a few visits to Russian enterprises can attest. But whether those changes can be linked
in a systematic way to policies in such areas as privatization, liberalization and anti-trust,
or to the hardening of budget constraints is trickier.
Some might argue that it is still too early to look for systematic relationships. The
privatization program only nished its rst, \mass" phase in mid-1994 (the time of the
survey from which we draw most of our information in this paper), and sales of the re-
maining shares and companies are still ongoing as of late 1995. Competition is also only
gradually evolving, as new companies grow large enough to compete with the formerly
state-owned behemoths and as foreigners gingerly test the water, and Russian companies
are only moderate in their response. In a situation of great chaos and uncertainty, random
experimentation may seem to be the order of the day, making it hard to make any predic-
tions about the direction to be taken by \restructuring" enterprises. Moreover, together
with all the other changes, the ways of measuring those changes (accounting systems and
statistical reporting) are themselves changing, making it dicult to monitor and calibrate,
a problem still further exacerbated by the years of near-hyperination. Perhaps it would
indeed be better to \let the dust settle" a bit before trying to determine the new lay of
the land.
As against this epistemological pessimism, we would argue that much can be learned
in Russia, even in the short run, and that the situation is too exciting (and perhaps
dangerous) to wait for historians to sort out in the next generation. Moreover, if one is ever
in the future to be able to chart the path of transition, including thorough understanding
of the starting point, then the time for gathering data and trying to make sense of events
is already slipping away.
But most importantly, we believe that even the exploratory results oered in this paper
are instructive. Privatization seems to have a clear and substantial eect on productivity,
one which is robust across a wide variety of specications. Its eect on the restructuring
of product lines and employment (layos) is much less clear: privatization per se is not
consistently signicant. But we demonstrate that the specic type of new owner can make
a big dierence, a proposition for which we have argued on theoretical grounds (1995a).
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To test the intriguing notion that privatization and competition may have a complementary relation-
ship (for instance, so that competition would only have an eect on privatized companies), we also tried
specications including interaction terms for OWN and COMP, but the estimated coecients on these
variables were not signicant.
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Most importantly, worker-ownership is associated with less changes in the product mix
and with fewer layos, while managerial ownership is associated with more of both, and
outsider ownership with more product changes but no dierence in layos.
Our results for competition are more ambiguous. In some cases, we have managed to
unearth statistically signicant relationships among variables, but despite our attempts
to measure competition in a multitude of ways (as shown in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3),
it is hard to identify a consistent pattern. Where we have measured productivity in
terms of nominal sales per employee, it is possible that our results indicate the ability of
monopolists to raise prices and the degree to which import competition may limit that
power. This inference is strengthened by the lack of signicant eect of concentration
on productivity when the latter is dened in terms of real output, implying no eect of
market structure on real productivity.
One of the biggest surprises to us was that our variables measuring the location of rms
and the geographic scope of their markets bore no fruit. Either entered separately or as
interactions with concentration or import penetration ratios, neither group appeared to be
signicant in almost any equation. Most commentators on concentration and competition
policy in Russia (for instance, JST) maintain that market power is exercised primarily
on the regional level, and we were prepared to believe the same. But, on the contrary,
import penetration shows up as perhaps the strongest competition variable (although still
somewhat inconsistent), and its eect does not vary signicantly across regions.
Our analysis of these data thus seems to indicate that privatization is having some
positive impact, even if the large-scale giveaways to insiders diminish the benets. Per-
haps this provides some empirical support for the often heard recommendations (including
our own) for policies designed to facilitate secondary trading of shares and the entry of
outsiders. The eect of competition, on the other hand, is much less clear. Taken at
face value, the results suggest that regional market power is less important than many
commentators have assumed, while imports are already beginning to have some impact
nationwide. The data generally seem to reject competition variables as determinants of
restructuring. The other possibility is, as we have noted, that competition and market
power are extraordinarily dicult to measure, and that our variables are too highly aggre-
gated or imprecise to dene the relevant markets properly. Together with trying to gather
better indicators, it would be valuable to estimate similar relationships to those we have
examined in this paper using additional measures of rm behavior and restructuring. We
have begun to assemble a more systematic collection of such measures (1995c), and we
plan to report on their relationship with such variables representing important classes of
\motivators", such as ownership, competition, and budget constraints, at a later date.
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Table 1: Privatization by Sector of Russian Industry
Sector of Industry State Share Private Share PO% N
Energy and Fuel 52.4 47.6 42 19
Energy 72.0 28.0 29 7
Fuel 41.0 59.0 50 12
\Heavy Industry" 38.7 60.8 70 133
Ferrous metallurgy 16.6 83.4 90 10
Nonferrous metallurgy 21.1 78.3 88 8
Chemicals 17.0 83.0 85 13
Heavy machine building 30.9 69.1 75 20
Electrotechnical machinery 27.3 70.2 82 11
Machine tools and computers 60.9 39.1 43 14
Automobile industry 23.3 76.2 89 9
Agricultural machinery 41.9 58.1 69 13
Light machine building 60.5 39.5 50 4
Defense industry 53.4 46.6 73 11
Ship building 38.2 61.8 75 8
Radio industry 77.8 20.2 25 12
\Light Industry" 40.2 58.4 61 80
Communications and Electronics 43.1 54.9 60 15
Metal constructions 28.6 69.4 79 14
Machine repairing 35.8 61.0 53 15
Wood harvesting 73.9 26.1 22 9
Wood working industry 36.3 63.7 71 14
Construction materials 35.5 64.5 69 13
\Consumer Goods" 28.1 71.1 74 89
Textiles 17.1 81.6 82 22
Clothing industry 10.8 88.7 90 21
Food processing 41.6 56.8 67 18
Meat and milk 11.0 89.0 82 11
Other industrial production 60.0 39.2 47 17
Total Industry 37.0 62.4 67 321
Notes: PO% = percentage of rms in sector more than 50 percent privatized; N - number of rms in
sample. The total of State Shares and Private Shares does not always strictly equal 100, both because of
rounding errors and because of the occasional existence of \other" owners whose property status was not
specied. However, the magnitude of these unclassied \other" shares was never large enough to aect
the categorization of the rm as predominantly state or privately owned.
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Table 2: Disaggregated Shareholdings in Russian Industry
Means by Industry Groups Total Industry
Standard
Share Fuel & \Heavy \Light \Consumer Devia- Valid
Owners Energy Industry" Industry" Goods" Mean tion N
State 52.4 38.7 40.2 28.1 37.0 40.4 320
Private 47.6 60.8 58.4 71.7 62.4 40.1 319
Insiders 33.9 44.8 44.5 59.8 48.2 36.3 320
Managers 12.4 12.4 11.9 20.1 14.4 22.1 318
Workers 22.8 32.5 32.8 39.8 34.0 30.9 320
Outsiders 12.4 15.9 13.8 11.0 13.8 20.0 320
Banks 0.29 0.87 0.84 0.65 0.77 4.11 309
Investment
Funds 4.8 3.7 3.2 2.0 3.2 8.1 309
Other
Firms 0.59 4.7 3.9 4.8 4.3 11.4 309
Foreign 0.00 0.44 0.38 0.00 0.28 2.4 309
Individuals 4.7 4.8 5.1 3.1 4.4 11.4 309
Others 0.00 0.46 1.3 1.1 0.8 4.4 319
N 19 133 80 89 321
Notes: Industry groups are dened as in Table 1.
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Table 3.1: Measures of Market Power in Russia
Means by Industry Groups Total Industry
Standard
Variables Fuel & \Heavy \Light \Consumer Devia- Valid
Energy Industry" Industry" Goods" Mean tion N
CR4B 41.0 28.4 9.2 10.4 19.5 14.7 273
CR4J NA 46.5 44.3 25.7 44.3 22.0 103
CR4BJ 41.0 35.4 23.8 12.4 26.1 21.3 274
HIRAW 26.8 22.9 17.3 21.9 21.5 12.3 321
HIADJ 0.37 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.1 0.11 321
IP0 0.00 30.7 22.3 31.7 26.8 13.8 310
IP 0.00 28.8 20.9 21.0 23.1 12.6 304
CR4BIP 41.0 20.1 6.87 8.3 14.9 10.9 256
CR4JIP NA 33.7 36.0 31.6 34.0 15.0 100
CR4BJIP 41.0 25.5 18.7 10.3 20.4 16.1 257
PRICONT 70.6 42.1 38.7 34.1 40.5 49.2 304
N 19 133 80 89 321
Table 3.2: Subjective Measures of Market Power in Russia
Means by Industry Groups Total Industry
\Con- Standard
Variables Fuel & \Heavy \Light sumer Devia- Valid
Energy Industry" Industry" Goods" Mean tion N
MAJCOMPD 0.63 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.75 0.43 309
MAJCOMP# 14.8 19.7 19.0 27.0 21.0 101.8 267
MAJFORD 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.25 0.20 0.40 259
MAJFOR# 0.06 10.76 0.63 17.1 9.0 87.8 259
N 19 133 80 89 321
21
Table 3.3: Geographic Scope of Markets in Russia
Means by Industry Groups Total Industry
Standard
Variables Fuel & \Heavy \Light \Consumer Devia- Valid
Energy Industry" Industry" Goods" Mean tion N
RAYON 16.5 3.1 15.4 19.3 11.8 25.8 243
OBLAST 12.2 18.1 41.7 31.4 27.4 34.8 245
NATIONAL 60.1 65.4 35.6 40.0 50.1 39.0 248
FSU 7.8 8.3 5.0 1.7 5.7 10.0 289
CMEA 0.72 1.9 0.73 0.27 1.1 5.6 287
WEST 6.9 5.7 1.7 3.5 4.2 12.7 286
N 19 133 80 89 321
Table 4: Measures of Restructuring in Russia
Means by Industry Groups Total Industry
Standard
Variables Fuel & \Heavy \Light \Consumer Devia- Valid
Energy Industry" Industry" Goods" Mean tion N
S/EMP4 21.6 6.7 4.7 9.6 8.0 10.2 234
S/EMP0 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08 171
RX/EMP4 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.22 116
RX/EMP0 0.11 0.12 0.25 0.36 0.22 0.32 284
CORPROD 0.61 0.50 0.64 0.61 0.56 0.65 153
LAYOFF 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.11 235
N 19 133 80 89 321
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Table 5.1: Regression Results for Labor Productivity [Log(S/EMP4)]
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Specication
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
PSH 0.44
b
0.51
b
0.32
a
(0.21) (0.23) (0.19)
WSH 0.42
a
0.24 0.21
(0.25) (0.31) (0.25)
MSH 0.46 0.94
a
0.63
a
(0.38) (0.58) (0.38)
OSH 0.47 0.83
a
0.32
(0.36) (0.44) (0.37)
CR4BJ 0.02
b
0.02
b
(0.01) (0.01)
CR4BJIP -0.09
b
-0.09
b
(0.02) (0.02)
1/(1+MAJCOM#) -0.10 -0.15
(0.36) (0.37)
MAJFORD -0.15 -0.09
(0.20) (0.21)
PRICONT -0.03 -0.03
(0.15) (0.15)
GOVSUP -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.16 -0.15
(0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15)
Log(S/EMP0) 0.40
b
0.40
b
0.38
b
0.37
b
0.47
b
0.46
b
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 2.77
b
2.77
b
2.72
b
2.68
b
3.19
b
3.16
b
(0.35) (0.35) (0.40) (0.40) (0.35) (0.35)
Adj R
2
0.36 0.35 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.21
N 125 125 99 99 156 156
Notes:
a
signicant at 0.1 level;
b
signicant at 0.05 level.
23
Table 5.2: Regression Results for Labor Productivity [Log(RX/EMP4]
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Specication
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
PSH 0.44 -0.14 0.21
(0.30) (0.32) (0.26)
WSH 0.41 -0.25 0.18
(0.37) (0.45) (0.32)
MSH 0.92
a
0.47 0.78
(0.55) (0.76) (0.49)
OSH 0.09 -0.42 -0.19
(0.54) (0.58) (0.49)
CR4BJ 1E-03 1.9E-03
(0.01) (0.01)
CR4BJIP -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
1/(1+MAJCOMP#) -0.55 -0.60
(0.52) (0.53)
MAJFORD 0.26 0.24
(0.28) (0.29)
PRICONT -0.25 -0.24
(0.21) (0.21)
GOVSUP 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.08
(0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) (0.20) (0.20)
Log(RX/EMP0) .99
b
0.97
b
1.00
b
0.98
b
0.99
b
0.99
b
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant -1.17
b
-1.22
b
-0.74
b
-0.76
b
-0.82
b
-0.86
b
(0.33) (0.34) (0.38) (0.38) (0.29) (0.29)
Adj R
2
0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.69
N 88 88 64 64 110 110
Notes:
a
signicant at 0.1 level;
b
signicant at 0.05 level.
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Table 5.3: Regression Results for Changes in Product Lines (CORPROD)
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Specication
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
PSH 0.22 0.19 0.20
(0.15) (0.17) (0.14)
WSH 0.45
b
0.29 0.36
b
(0.19) (0.22) (0.18)
MSH -0.09 -0.55 -0.13
(0.24) (0.31) (0.24)
OSH 0.03 0.73
b
0.19
(0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
CR4BJ 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.004)
CR4BJ*IP -0.03
b
-0.03
b
(0.01) (0.01)
1/(1+MAJCOM#) 0.06 0.13
(0.25) (0.24)
MAJFORD 0.02 -0.03
(0.17) (0.17)
PRICONT 0.03 0.04
(0.10) (0.11)
GOVSUP 0.09 0.08 0.01 -0.08 0.05 0.04
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
Constant 0.41
b
0.42
b
0.46
b
0.48
b
0.40
b
0.40
b
(0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14)
Adj R
2
0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.002
N 124 124 88 88 148 148
Notes:
a
signicant at 0.1 level;
b
signicant at 0.05 level.
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Table 5.4: Regression Results for Layos
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Specication
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
PSH 0.04
a
0.03 0.03
a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
WSH 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
MSH 0.07
a
0.09
b
0.07
b
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
OSH 0.03 -5.9E-04 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
CR4BJ -4.6E-04 -4.2E-04
(6.8E-04) (6.9E-04)
CR4BJIP 9.2E-04 9.1E-04
(2.0E-03) (2.0E-03)
1/(1+MAJCOM#) 5.6E-03 2.6E-03
(0.03) (0.03)
MAJFORD 6.2E-03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
PRICONT -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
GOVSUP -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
a
-0.03
a
-0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.06
b
0.06
b
0.05
b
0.05
b
0.06
b
0.06
b
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Adj R
2
0.01 0.003 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
N 182 182 136 136 230 230
Notes:
a
signicant at 0.1 level;
b
signicant at 0.05 level.
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